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AUCTIONING AIRSPACE
Brent Skorup*
The commercialization of air taxis and autonomous passenger
drones will one day congest urban airspace. Operators expect that,
once flights are autonomous and the cost of service falls, high-traffic
urban “vertiports” could see hundreds of air taxi takeoffs and
landings per hour. Low-altitude airspace—between 200 feet and
5,000 feet above ground level—offers a relatively blank slate to
explore new regulatory models for air traffic management and avoid
command-and-control mistakes made in the past in aviation.
Regulators’ current proposals would centralize air taxi traffic
management into a single system to coordinate air taxi traffic, but
this approach likely creates technology lock-in and unduly benefits
the initial operators at the expense of later innovators. To facilitate
the development of the air taxi market, regulators should consider
demarcating aerial travel corridors and auctioning exclusive-use
licenses to operators for use of those corridors, much like regulators
auction radio spectrum licenses and offshore wind energy sites.
Exclusive rights to routes would allow transfer and sale to more
efficient operators and would also give operators the certainty they
need to finance the substantial capital investments.
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With advancements in aviation technology, low-altitude
airspace presents a vast new resource for automated transportation
and delivery services. Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, also
called VTOLs or air taxis, are a new aerial transportation service
currently in development. VTOL aircraft and drone companies
expect that with computation advancements, autonomous VTOLs
will bring down the price of flights and make mass air transit
possible. Travelers in the future might routinely fly from downtown
Washington, D.C. to Dulles International Airport in under ten
minutes and Chicago families could escape the city heat and shuttle
high above Lake Michigan to Indiana dunes and beaches in under
twenty minutes. To prevent “route-squatting” and to facilitate the
development of this market the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) should consider demarcating aerial travel corridors and
auctioning exclusive-use licenses to VTOL operators for use of
those corridors. 1
1
Aerospace firms and vendors are identifying low-altitude aerial routes in
anticipation of urban air mobility services. See, e.g., Nexa Capital Partners
launches Urban Air Mobility Geomatics, EVTOL MAGAZINE (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://evtol.com/news/nexa-capital-partners-launches-urban-air-mobilitygeomatics/ [https://perma.cc/6L24-UKQU] (providing an example of a company
offering aerospace industry customers “capabilities such as identifying simple
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Perhaps the primary obstacle to urban air mobility is integration
of thousands of VTOL aircraft into regulated federal airspace. The
U.S. aviation industry has a commendable safety record and
regulators are cautious. However, the technological shock—the
commercialization of air taxis—will create novel urban airspace
scarcity and collective action conflicts. The overwhelmed U.S. air
traffic control system handles about 5,000 aircraft in the sky at a
given time. 2 U.S. regulators acknowledge that traditional air traffic
management will not be able to handle drones and VTOLs. 3 When
intended uses conflict, how should low-altitude airspace be
allocated? This is an old problem for a resource: the transformation
of a common pool resource in the face of intensive, new uses. 4 Ad
hoc regulatory interventions won’t suffice, nor will traditional air
traffic control, as aviation authorities in the U.S. appear to be
preparing to largely delegate day-to-day low-altitude airspace
management of drones and VTOLs to commercial operators. 5

‘verti-pairs’ (flights between two vertiports) that can support profitable eVTOL
operations”).
2
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Air Traffic By The Numbers, https://www.faa.gov/
air_traffic/by_the_numbers/ [https://perma.cc/ZRS7-3ZDB] (last modified June
6, 2019). VTOLs and drones could plausibly exceed that number in a single city.
Uber, Uber Elevate Summit 2018: Live Stream Day 1 (Part 2) at 3:55:20,
YOUTUBE (May 8, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWvQuk0_xjs
[https://perma.cc/UKT8-XYGK] (“If you ask: Can we add thousands of aircraft
and control them in the traditional way? The answer is: Absolutely not.”).
3
NASA, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
(UTM) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS VERSION 1.0 2 (May 18, 2018),
https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/2018-UTM-ConOps-v1.0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MD38-FAYS] (“Given the number and type of UAS operations
envisioned, it is clear that the existing Air Traffic Management (ATM) System
cannot cost-effectively scale to deliver services for UAS. Further, the nature of
most of these operations does not require direct interaction with the ATM
System.”).
4
See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights and Governance Strategies: How
Best to Deal with Land, Water, Intellectual Property, and Spectrum, 14 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 181, 188–89 (2016).
5
See Press release, NASA, NASA Completes its Latest Drone Traffic
Management Flight Campaign, (June 8, 2017) https://www.nasa.gov/aero/nasacompletes-latest-drone-traffic-management-flight-campaign
[https://perma.cc/5NGT-6CWA].
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Private management of low-altitude airspace to accommodate
VTOLs is still at a nascent stage. Theorists, regulators, and
lawmakers have the daunting task of ascertaining which legal
institutions for airspace optimize public use, safety, and benefit. 6
Since a side-by-side comparison of legal institutions for airspace is
infeasible at present, this article looks to property theory and draws
on how the government disposes of other public assets to private
management.
For traditional aviation, air traffic management is centralized
and relies on complex collaboration between airlines, the general
aviation industry, air traffic controllers, and regulators. Safe
separation between aircraft, 7 routes, 8 and slot fees 9 are highly
regulated in this interconnected system. Economic distortions result
from the regulated rationing of airspace and terminal access. 10 LowRichard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 412 (1987)
(“The task of justification has been to show what general set of legal institutions
will advance the welfare of the public at large, when measured against the next
best alternative.”). See also RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE
LAW 153–154 (1990) (urging theorists to use an opportunity-cost approach “when
dealing with questions of economic policy and to compare the total product
yielded by alternative social arrangements”).
7
Radar separation standards typically require air traffic controllers to maintain
at least three nautical miles between aircraft near airports. FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
Final Report 7, Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee,
Separation
Standards
Working
Group
(2006),
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ang/offices/tc/about/
campus/faa_host/RDM/media/pdf/Report-SepStandardsWorkingGroup.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6FLQ-KDNP]. See North Atlantic Operations – Airspace,
SKYBRARY, https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/North_Atlantic_Operations__Airspace [https://perma.cc/N7QY-DLKU] (explaining that aircraft flying over
the North Atlantic have prescribed vertical and horizontal minimum separation).
8
Fed. Aviation Admin., Instrument Procedures Handbook 2–2 (2017)
(“Airways can be thought of as three-dimensional highways for aircraft. In most
land areas of the world, aircraft are required to fly airways between the departure
and destination airports. The rules governing airway routing, Standard Instrument
Departures (SID) and Standard Terminal Arrival (STAR), are published flight
procedures that cover altitude, airspeed, and requirements for entering and leaving
the airway.”).
9
49 U.S.C. § 41714 (2012) (defining “slot” as “a reservation for an instrument
flight rule takeoff or landing by an air carrier of an aircraft in air transportation.”).
10
Trump Wants to Privatize Air Traffic Control; Canada and Europe Prove It
BUSINESS
DAILY
(June
5,
2017),
Will
Work,
INVESTOR’S
6
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altitude airspace—used here to mean between 200 feet and 5,000
feet above ground level 11—offers a relatively blank slate to explore
new models for air transport and avoid command-and-control
mistakes made in the past in aviation.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I briefly covers the
commercial VTOL industry, the history of airspace regulation, and
public property theory. Part II describes U.S. regulators’ tentative
plans for VTOL aircraft management and the “regulated commons”
model, which resembles today’s air traffic control, whereby routes
and terminal access are shared and managed within a single
unmanned traffic management (UTM) system or database. Part III
describes likely competitive and technical problems with this
regulated commons and UTM approach. Part IV introduces a
different idea: that the FAA instead delimit geographic tracts of lowaltitude airspace and assign exclusive-use licenses to those aerial
routes via auction for a term of years. Flight path, speed, terminal
https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/trumps-plan-to-privatize-airtraffic-control-would-follow-canadas-and-europes-lead/ [https://perma.cc/6LN2MBV8] (“The Federal Aviation Administration-run ATC system in the U.S., in
contrast, has been a monument to mismanagement and waste.”). DJ Gribbin et al.,
Toward a More Efficient Use of Airspace, 76 J. TRANSP. L., LOGISTICS & POL’Y
20, 92 (2009) (“Slots are a valuable public resource; yet they have been
underutilized for decades as a result of a failure to clearly define property rights
to slots and to provide appropriate incentives for slots to be used in a manner of
greatest benefit to the traveling public.”). See also Marvin S. Soroos, The
Commons in the Sky: The Radio Spectrum and Geosynchronous Orbit as Issues
in Global Policy, 36 INT’L ORG. 665, 673–74 (1982) (describing the hoarding of
geosynchronous orbital slots when assigned via regulation).
11
VTOL use today appears to be contemplated up to 5000 feet. Margaret
Brown, New York Drone Corridor Enables Testing of UAS Platforms and UTM
Technologies in Real-World Settings, THE NEW AIRSPACE (June 5, 2018),
https://thenewairspace.com/2018/06/05/new-york-drone-corridor-enablestesting-of-uas-platforms-and-utm-technologies-in-real-world-settings/
[https://perma.cc/RFF8-2DU8]. Airspace use below 200 feet raises fraught
questions about the property rights of landowners and is outside the purview of
this paper. See Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252, 254
(1991) (“Courts are notoriously unwilling to quantify the extent of the airspace
which falls within the dominion of the landowner . . . .”); Colin Cahoon, Low
Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157,
191 (1990) (“[C]ourts have yet to adopt a uniform theory of airspace property
ownership.”).
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locations, aircraft size, UTM technologies, and pricing choices
would largely be delegated to the tract licensees. Finally, Part V
explains why this approach, which draws on real-world examples
from spectrum auctions and other federal asset markets, may offer
more competitive UTMs and dynamic efficiencies for low-altitude
air transit. This auction approach also allows aviation regulators to
focus less on scientific management of airspace and UTM
interoperability and more on aircraft safety, dangerous weather, and
inspections.
This article assumes that navigable airspace will remain publicly
owned and does not propose the introduction of fee simple property
in this airspace. 12 James Buchanan’s work on club goods 13 initiated
a rich literature that shuns the private property-public property
dichotomy in favor of nuanced analysis of various categories on the
“property spectrum.” 14 In that vein, this article analyzes a common
category on the spectrum, “licensed property”: publicly-owned
resources that are used or processed by private operators for
commerce and public benefit. 15
12
This paper proposes for airspace what Prof. Raymond dubbed “licensed
property.” See LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC RESOURCES:
EQUITY AND PROPERTY ALLOCATION IN MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 14 (Routledge 2003).
13
James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1, 1
(1965) (noting there is “a whole spectrum of ownership-consumption
possibilities, ranging from the purely private or individualized activity on the one
hand to purely public or collectivized activity on the other.”).
14
See, e.g., Aleksandar D. Slaev & Marcus Collier, Managing Natural
Resources: Coasean Bargaining versus Ostromian Rules of Common
Governance, 85 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 47 (2018); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(2011).
15
See RAYMOND, supra note 12. Licensed property means “a private legal right
that provides a significant degree of security and exclusivity to resource users but
remains unprotected from future government adjustment or cancellation without
compensation.” Id. at 15. Other types of licensed property in the United States
include unpatented mining claims, federal grazing permits, and individual
transferable quotas for fisheries. Id. at 18-23. See, e.g., Vernon L. Smith, On
Divestiture and the Creation of Property Rights in Public Lands, 2 CATO J. 663
(1982); Walter J. Mead, Natural Resource Disposal Policy—Oral Auction Versus
Sealed Bids, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 194 (1967).
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Aviation regulators should assess the feasibility of airspace
auctions promptly because, as described below, it is very difficult to
introduce such market-based assignment later, even after the
drawbacks of a regulated commons regime are obvious. The FAA’s
Drone Advisory Committee included this proposal in its 2018
report. 16 Subsequently, in the FAA’s 2018 reauthorization law,
Congress instructed the Government Accountability Office to study
this airspace auction proposal as a financing mechanism. 17 VTOL
companies would like to start testing commercial service as early as
2023 in the U.S., 18 and timely resolution of airspace deconfliction is
essential for the industry to thrive.
I.
BACKGROUND
Before discussing VTOL traffic management approaches, a
description of the VTOL industry, airspace regulation, and
underlying property theory is required to familiarize readers with the
technology and regulatory tradeoffs.
A. VTOL Transportation Industry
Though designs vary, VTOLs tend to be multi-rotor, one- to sixpassenger aircraft that land and take off like helicopters and fly at

See DRONE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DRONE
INTEGRATION
FUNDING
FINAL
REPORT
21–22,
(Mar.
2018),
https://www.rtca.org/sites/default/files/dac_tg3_funding_report_long_term_final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B49F-5BGN] (discussing the “Auction or Lease of
Airspace”). The author was invited to present the idea of airspace auctions to Task
Group 3 in 2017.
17
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 360(b) (instructing
the Comptroller Generalto study “any recommendations of Task Group 3 of the
Drone Advisory Committee”). Task Group 3 of the FAA’s Drone Advisory
Committee included airspace auctions as a possible mechanism for funding drone
regulation. See also DRONE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 21-22
(discussing the “Auction or Lease of Airspace”).
18
Marcy de Luna, Uber’s flying taxis are coming to one Texas city in 2023,
HOUSTON CHRON. (June 19, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/
news/transportation/article/Uber-Air-Skyports-launch-Dallas-Texas-202314015577.php [https://perma.cc/K9X5-5Q6D].
16
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several hundred feet above the ground. 19 Electric VTOL (eVTOL)
companies are designing battery-powered aircraft for commuter and
intra-metropolitan transportation, that is, a range up to sixty miles. 20
Other companies are designing hybrid (fuel-electric) VTOLs, which
will have a range of a few hundred miles and serve inter-city
routes. 21 VTOLs in urban areas would land at helipads and, one day,
“vertiports”—specially-designed helipad-like landing structures for
VTOL operations. 22
Improvements in manufacturing, battery technology, sensors,
autonomous systems, and networking have spurred a global race to
commercialize autonomous air taxi flight, and companies have
completed test flights. 23 VTOL companies are planning to test
(piloted, at first) VTOL flights in the U.S. in the next few years and

See
Electric
VTOL
News,
eVTOL
Aircraft
Directory,
https://evtol.news/aircraft/ [https://perma.cc/MKK5-5M44] (last visited Sep. 9,
2019), for examples of eVTOL and hybrid VTOL designs.
20
See Jerry Siebenmark, Uber Elevate Summit Lays Out 2023 Flight Plan, AIN
ONLINE (June 28, 2019), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/
business-aviation/2019-06-28/uber-elevate-summit-lays-out-2023-flight-plan
[https://perma.cc/2LHQ-AYLV].
21
See, e.g., Talia Avakian, Flying Taxi Company Wants to Get You From New
York City to Boston in 36 Minutes, TRAVEL + LEISURE (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.travelandleisure.com/airlines-airports/transcend-air-corporationflying-taxis [https://perma.cc/ZU8N-4T3F]; Loz Blain, Joby’s wild 16-rotor
convertible aircraft for long-range, high-speed, electric VTOL commuting, NEW
ATLAS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://newatlas.com/joby-s2-tilt-rotor-vtol-multirotoraircraft-concept/40662/ [https://perma.cc/4NKP-TA5N].
22
See Joe Pappalardo, The “Mega Skyport” Is a Fanciful Future Landing Spot
for Uber’s Flying Taxis, POPULAR MECHANICS (July 19, 2018),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a22454961/mega-skyport-uberflying-taxi-vertiport/ [https://perma.cc/Y92G-P3EB].
23
In early 2018, Chinese drone maker Ehang flew an autonomous VTOL on a
15-kilometer (9.3 mile) route. Andrew J. Hawkins, Ehang’s passenger-carrying
drones look insanely impressive in first test flights, THE VERGE (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/5/16974310/ehang-passenger-carrying-dronefirst-test-flight [https://perma.cc/BA59-VZ42]; Matthew Campbell, Jie Ma, &
Kiyotaka Matsuda, Japan is Getting Serious About Flying Cars, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2019-01-22/the-birthplace-of-the-walkman-wants-to-be-first-in-flyingcars [https://perma.cc/4RCS-NA3U].
19
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to scale up operations as technology and regulation allow. 24 Already
in 2019, a Chinese eVTOL company, Ehang, began flying tourists
in a two-passenger, autonomous eVTOL aircraft, 25 and many
companies are testing aircraft around the world.
If regulators allow this form of transportation, and the costs of
flight fall with the introduction of autonomous systems and UTM,
the busiest VTOL vertiports would see hundreds of takeoffs and
landings per hour. 26 At scale, there will be a need to manage flights
landing or taking off every few seconds from each high-traffic
vertiport, and each VTOL will have to be charged, cleaned, and
turned over for a new flight in minutes. 27 Many VTOL (and perhaps
large drone) operations may depend on these tight turnarounds, and
vertiports require substantial investments in terminals, operations,
and infrastructure.
The nascent vertical takeoff and landing aircraft industry could
stimulate substantial consumer demand for millions of low-altitude
passenger flights in the U.S. annually. Regulators are likely to see
several UTM and VTOL operators in urban areas. 28 It’s possible to
24
See Emily Chang & Thomas Black, Boeing CEO Says Air-Taxi Prototype
Will Be Ready for Takeoff Next Year, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-03/boeing-ceo-sees-air-taxiprototype-ready-for-takeoff-next-year [https://perma.cc/7AX6-7DDX].
25
Chen Chuanren, China Abuzz with eVTOL Action, AIN ONLINE (Apr. 17,
2019),
https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2019-0417/china-abuzz-evtol-action [https://perma.cc/TW6S-P65E].
26
At a 2018 conference devoted to the nascent industry, for instance, Uber
representatives estimated, based on Uber trip data, that if prices fall according to
their models there is demand for hundreds of thousands of daily air taxi trips and
the potential need for 40 vertiports the Los Angeles area alone. Uber, Uber
Elevate Summit 2018: Live Stream Day 1 (Part 1), YOUTUBE (May 8, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnceMcSnjQ0
[https://perma.cc/H9EVQSHA].
27
Id. “In this 40-node network [in the Los Angeles region], about 80% of
the nodes require a throughput of about 400 to 800 landings per hour.”
28
Uber, Amazon, Google, Skyward, Airmap, Thales, Rockwell Collins, and
others all anticipate being in the UTM space. Some plan to manage drones, some
plan to manage VTOLs, and some plan to manage both types of services. See,
e.g., Press Release, NASA, supra note 5; Luke Geiver, Global airspace group
headed to NY for UAS UTM work, UAS MAGAZINE (Apr. 7, 2018),
http://www.uasmagazine.com/articles/1842/global-airspace-group-headed-to-nyfor-uas-utm-work [https://perma.cc/A334-QQYK]; Mike Ball, Rockwell Collins
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make out the shape of competing business models and use cases—
and sources—of airspace conflicts. Should urban VTOL corridors
be for rapid commuting or for slower freight? Should regular,
scheduled flights receive takeoff and landing precedence over
episodic, recreational flights? How should landing, takeoff, and
maintenance fees be priced? Who funds vertiport creation and
upgrades? These and other questions depend on what institutions
regulators choose to use to manage airspace and flight
management. 29
B. History of Airspace Regulation
Navigable airspace—which includes the VTOL airspace
contemplated here 30—in the U.S. is quasi-public property and the
federal government regulates access. 31 Some natural resources—
like navigable waters, airspace, and beaches—are customarily held
in common but, once use increases, require specialized rules from
the state, and even state control, to improve productive use. 32

Demonstrates UAS Command & Control Datalink for NASA UTM, UNMANNED
SYSTEMS NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/
2018/04/rockwell-collins-demonstrates-uas-command-control-datalink-for-nasautm/ [https://perma.cc/AB8W-AVWX]; Tiernan Ray, LiDAR! Flying Taxis! Your
Brain! The Changing Landscapes of CES, BARRON’S (Jan. 16, 2018),
http://www.barrons.com/amp/articles/lidar-flying-taxis-your-brain-thechanging-landscape-of-ces-1516145041
[https://perma.cc/Y4BS-SSJA]
(describing Bell Helicopter plans to deploy “air taxis” by 2025 in cities); Monica
Alleven, Skyward aims to be the Verizon of drone services, Fierce Wireless (July
6, 2017), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/skyward-aims-to-be-verizondrone-services [https://perma.cc/JLG2-N3KH].
29
See E. Tazewell Ellett & Matthew J. Clark, Passengers Without Pilots:
Toward a Brave New World of Drones, 45 VA. B. ASS’N J. 18, 21 (2018).
30
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012) (“‘Navigable airspace’ means airspace
above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations . . . , including
airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft.”).
31
Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (stating “it is well established under federal law that the navigable airspace
is public property not subject to private ownership.”) (citing 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(a)(2) (2000)).
32
Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How Regulated?: The Evolution of
Property Rights Systems, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2341 (2015). For a discussion of
nineteenth century doctrines for “inherently public property,” see Carol Rose, The
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Richard Epstein points out, as an illustration, that by the eighteenth
century heavily-trafficked river systems in England had developed
elements of state ownership and control, which increased commerce
and kept waters navigable. 33 For some resources, particularly with
property necessary for extensive transportation networks,
government control is necessary to enhance commerce because the
holdout problems associated with bargaining with innumerable
property owners tend to prove intractable. 34
As with rivers, airspace developed elements of state control and
then formal public ownership once aviation made airspace
“navigable.” The development of hot-air balloons, zeppelins, and
early flying machines put stress on the ad coelum doctrine 35—the
historic notion that landowners had title to an indefinite height above
their land—and by 1910 common law courts recognized that
airspace was not, strictly speaking, private property. 36 Courts and
legislatures found that a navigation servitude was necessary to
prevent landowners from excluding flights that harmlessly took
place hundreds or thousands of feet above their property. 37 It wasn’t
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
33
Epstein, supra note 32, at 2356–57 (As river traffic grows heavier, “the water
system transforms itself from a res commune to one that has strong elements of
government ownership and control.”); Epstein, supra note 6, at 416 (“It is
therefore possible to have a system of public ownership without an extensive
government to administer it. The recognition of the public’s navigation servitude
in the original position ironically serves to reduce the size of government while
recognizing the customary public ownership of public goods . . . .”) (italics in
original).
34
Epstein, supra note 6, at 415 (“The risk is that the owner of one segment will
hold out against all the others, so that bargaining breakdown will prevent any use
of the river at all for navigation.”).
35
BERKELEY REYNOLDS DAVIDS, THE LAW OF MOTOR VEHICLES 292 (1911).
36
See Arthur K. Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aërial Law, 4 AM. J. INTERNAT’L
L. 109 (1910). The Supreme Court later repudiated the ad coelum doctrine, stating
that it “has no place in the modern world.” United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,
261 (1946).
37
DAVIDS, supra note 35, at 292 (“The air domain of a proprietor may be
utilized by him to any extent, but in so far as he has not appropriated it, it must be
deemed to be subject to a servitude of passage by aviators. The case is analogous
to that of the highway upon which the public have a right of passage, while the
fee remains in the owner of the abutting land.”) (citation omitted).
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a large legal leap, then, for some courts to declare navigable airspace
public property. 38
C. Creation of Property Institutions in the Face of Technology
Shocks
To date, low-altitude airspace use is relatively infrequent and
highly dependent on norms and relatively simple rules of
operation. 39 Episodic use of low-altitude airspace includes
helicopter trips for tourists, traffic reports, and hospitals in many
urban areas, as well as general aviation and model airplane flights
for recreation and hobbyists. As Elinor Ostrom showed, small,
homogeneous groups like these with regular interaction can create
enduring, self-governing common pool resource institutions, 40
especially when uses are light.
Customary arrangements like this, however, are not sustainable
in the face of a large demand shock for the resource and the presence
Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (stating “it is well established under federal law that the navigable airspace
is public property not subject to private ownership.”) (citing 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(a)(2) (2000)); 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012) (“‘Navigable airspace’
means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations
. . . , including airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of
aircraft.”).
39
This is particularly for airspace up to 1200 feet above ground level, which is
Class G (uncontrolled) airspace in much of the country. See, e.g., Press Release,
NASA, supra note 5, at 3 (“ATC has no responsibility to provide separation
services in Class G airspace, rather, manned aircraft cooperatively manage their
operations based on specified principles of operations.”); Pia Bergqvist, The
Freedom and Flexibility of Flying VFR, FLYING MAG (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://www.flyingmag.com/flying-vfr-offers-greater-freedom-and-flexibility
[https://perma.cc/V677-M5ZT] (discussing the “unstructured nature” of lowaltitude visual flight rules). The FAA has “helicopter highway” routes mapped for
AVIATION
ADMIN.,
VFR
Raster
Charts,
pilots.
FEDERAL
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/digital_products/vfr/
[https://perma.cc/AG8G-N8N9] (last modified July 19, 2019). Joe Pappalardo,
Dallas Flyers Club: What Uber’s Flying Taxi Future Feels like, POPULAR
MECHANICS (May 2, 2018), https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/
a20122610/uber-elevate-flying-taxi-dallas-bell-helicopter/
[https://perma.cc/P2VT-NJSV] (But “[i]n many places, using these routes is
optional . . . .”).
40
Ostrom, supra note 14, at 58–89.
38
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of many new claimants. 41 For land and chattels, as Harold Demsetz
illustrated, “property rights arise when it becomes economic for
those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and costs.” 42
Often an exogenous event—like a technology improvement 43 or a
new settlement 44—occurs and then property institutions emerge to
define and parcel out previously common pool resources.
There are several examples in North American history where
property rights emerged to coordinate increased use of natural
resources that were once common pool resources. Native Americans
around Quebec divided their hunting land around 1700 because of
increased demand for animal fur. 45 Cattlemen fenced off the Great
Plains as land value increased and the cost of defining property
rights decreased from 1860 to 1900. 46 Property rights in radio
frequencies developed in the 1920s because of the emergence of
broadcast radio technology. 47 The transformation from common
pool resource to exclusive use can be costly, but the rise in
Epstein, supra note 4, at 188-89 (“And it follows that intense use creates the
risk of collision, congestion, confusion, or worse. So eventually somebody says,
and everyone recognizes, the need to control the commons . . . .”) (citiation
omitted). Gary D. Libecap, State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool
Resources, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 545, 547 (Claude
Menard & Mary M. Shirley, eds., Springer 2008) (“When transaction costs rise
due to larger numbers of heterogeneous competitors, perhaps attracted by
exogenous forces, such as price increases or technological changes, that raise the
value of the asset or that lower the costs of entry, then local, informal
arrangements, such as community norms may no longer be effective in combating
the wastes of open access.”).
42
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 354 (1967).
43
See Svetozar Pejovich, Towards an Economic Theory of the Creation and
Specification of Property Rights, 30 REV. SOC. ECON. 309, 310 (1972).
44
See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study
of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 170–72 (1975).
45
Demsetz, supra note 42, at 351–53.
46
Anderson & Hill, supra note 44, at 170–172.
47
See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 143–44 (1990) (“There existed a very
lively market in broadcast properties, sold with frequency rights attached, early in
the development of the industry (that is, pre-1927).”); Howard A. Shelanski &
Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum,
41 J.L. & ECON. 581 (1998).
41
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productivity increases the value of the underlying resource and
offsets the costs of defining and enforcing use rights. 48
Airspace, like spectrum, navigable rivers, certain oil reserves,
and timber lands, is a valuable resource managed on behalf of the
public by the State. Property institutions cannot develop via custom
or natural law for rationing public resources and the state must
introduce property institutions to ensure productive use. 49 There are
two basic paradigms for use of publicly-owned resource use: open
access and exclusive use. 50 Open access means anyone can use the
resource without limit. 51 Public sidewalks for pedestrians and open
access publications are examples. 52 Exclusive use means legal
control or ownership by a sole party. Real estate and licensed
spectrum are examples. 53
Publicly-controlled resources vary immensely in their
character—taxi medallions, public parks, navigable waters, radio
spectrum, game animals—and a resource use paradigm, once
selected de jure, requires iteration and modification to ensure
productive use. 54 Elinor Ostrom’s work on resource management
suggests that “getting the institutions right” is a “difficult, timeconsuming, conflict-invoking process.” 55 “The trick” for the state,

Demsetz, supra note 42, at 354 (“I have argued that property rights arise
when it becomes economic for those affected by externalities to internalize the
benefits and costs.”).
49
Epstein, supra note 32, at 2356–57 (As river traffic grows heavier, “the water
system transforms itself from a res commune to one that has strong elements of
government ownership and control.”).
50
Richard Epstein, Property Rights in Water, Spectrum, and Minerals, 86 U.
COLO. L. REV. 389, 392 (2015).
51
James A. Swaney, Common Property, Reciprocity, and Community, 24 J. OF
ECON. ISSUES 451, 451–53 (1990).
52
See, e.g., Licenses and Open Access, CORNELL COPYRIGHT INFORMATION
CENTER, https://copyright.cornell.edu/license_OA [https://perma.cc/X4GNKA57] (stating open access “refers to freely available, digital, online
information”).
53
See Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Advanced Wireless
Technologies and Public Policy, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 595, 603–04 (2006)
(describing licensed spectrum).
54
Epstein, supra note 50.
55
Ostrom, supra note 14, at 14.
48
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Epstein notes, “is to pick the right initial point to reduce the stress
on making these further adjustments.” 56
II.
AIRSPACE AS A REGULATED COMMONS
It is common, as explained below, for the government to deconflict a valuable public resource by auctioning geographic,
exclusive assignments. An alternative way to ration and de-conflict
a federally-controlled resource is for the government to try to
preserve a semblance of open access. To prevent a tragedy of the
commons, 57 rationing and de-confliction is achieved via regulation
of equipment, technologies, and business models—a regulated
commons. 58
This regulated commons model for VTOL and drone airspace is
currently being explored in the U.S. 59 A regulated commons regime
is seen in certain bands of spectrum 60 and for traditional aviation. A
central administrator, which can be public or private, assigns access
to the resource, often in response to real time demands. Regulators
Epstein, supra note 50.
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
58
More precisely, a regulated common pool resource. Fisheries are another
example of a regulated common pool resource. See Carsten L. Jensen, Reduction
of the fishing capacity in ‘common pool’ fisheries, 26 MARINE POL’Y 155 (2002).
59
See NASA, supra note 3. The NASA UTM plans focus on management of
drone operations, but experts expect that UTM will be incorporate VTOLs as the
industry develops. See Ellett & Clark, supra note 29. Lilium, a VTOL aircraft
company, similarly “is advocating an open system of VTOL landing pads, similar
to public roads or airports today.” Elan Head, Lilium bets on regional mobility,
EVTOL MAGAZINE (Sept. 11, 2019), https://evtol.com/features/lilium-bets-onregional-mobility/ [https://perma.cc/E4SX-2TUM].
60
In many ways, the regulated commons approach for VTOL resembles the
“spectrum commons” movement that was in vogue over a decade ago. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 76 (2002). The regulated sharing of
valuable “unlicensed” spectrum appears to have stalled because of the difficulty
and inefficiency, anticipated by scholars like Jerry Brito and Thomas Hazlett.
Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, 2007 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 1, 1 (2007); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited
Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald
Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 335, 495 (2001) (“‘Open access’ is not truly open under the FCC’s
unlicensed rules. Equipment regulation is used to prevent over-grazing.”).
56
57
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envision that VTOL (and drone) airspace management should
resemble traditional airspace management in several key ways. 61
Namely, there will be a single UTM system (or a few systems that
interoperate on regulated terms). 62 As NASA has said, “[UTM] is a
community-based traffic management system, where . . . [o]perators
share their flight intent with each other and coordinate to de-conflict
and safely separate trajectories.” 63
With a regulated commons model, airspace and terminal
management and de-confliction would take place, as with traditional
air transportation, on an inter-firm basis. 64 Routes and vertiports, as
with the commercial airline industry, will not be exclusive, they will
be shared regularly every day. 65 In this scenario, VTOL and drone
operators will input prospective flights into the UTM system and
regulator-approved UTM system operators will use inputted data in
real time to share the skies and schedule VTOL flights. 66 Experts
anticipate that, with this model, because inter-firm sharing of the
airspace is required, VTOLs and drones will need mandated and
interoperable technologies like reliance on detect-and-avoid
capabilities, ADS-B, airborne radar, or ground-based radar. 67
III.
PROBLEMS WITH A REGULATED COMMONS
This regulated commons regime—withholding geographic
exclusivity and delegating VTOL (and drone) traffic management

See NASA, supra note 3, at 4.
Id. (“The term ‘UTM’ refers to a set of federated services and an allencompassing framework for managing multiple UAS operations.”).
63
Id. at 4–5.
64
Id. at 5.
65
Id. at 12.
66
One possibility is that low-altitude airspace is “parcel-ized” by private UTM
systems. Uber has proposed a “dynamic skylane network” for VTOL traffic. Uber,
supra note 2, at 3:56:30. Dynamic skylane networks are virtual lanes in the sky
that are dynamically adjusted. Id. These can be monitored to measure
conformance within the lane. Id. The difference with the earlier auction and
exclusive-use proposal is that there would be inter-firm sharing of the dynamic
skylane parcels.
67
THE ASPEN INST., RETHINKING INSTITUTIONS OF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
14 (2018).
61
62
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to a single, interconnected UTM system—has foreseeable
challenges.
A. Over-regulation and Underutilization of Airspace
The primary problem with the regulated commons approach is
that innovators might deliver on their promise of mass air taxi
service and the planned UTM system cannot handle the traffic. As
NASA points out in one of its UTM reports, its regulated commons
approach may suffice with modest levels of low-altitude air traffic:
“[i]n airspace with moderate airspace demand, equitable access is
achieved through Operator collaboration, efficient airspace design,
and FAA rules.” 68 However, the report adds, “if demand for a
volume of airspace becomes too great to maintain safety of flight, or
support all types of operations, the FAA may be required to provide
demand management of access, but only for that purpose.” 69
The latter sentence raises alarm bells because, should the
industry develop into a mass market, regulators will be forced to
regularly referee competition for the most valuable urban airspace.
Recall that companies are anticipating that many VTOL vertiports
will be serving hundreds of landings per hour. 70 Consider the nature
of transportation networks, which tend to cluster into a hierarchy of
congested hubs, 71 the “lumpy” nature of urban travel (with peaks
during commutes and special events), and the inevitability of bad
weather, which requires re-scheduling. Almost certainly, under the
current UTM plans, regulators will regularly be “providing demand
management for airspace access” for valuable urban aerial corridors.
In spectrum 72 and aviation policy, a regulated commons with a
private administrator requires intensive certification regulations and
NASA, supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis added).
Id.
70
“In this 40-node network [in the Los Angeles region], about 80% of the
nodes require a throughput of about 400 to 800 landings per hour.” Uber, supra
note 2, at 59:57.
71
Liang Zhao et al., Onset of traffic congestion in complex networks, 71
PHYSICAL REV. 1, 1 (2005).
72
Where the regulators have a regulated commons for spectrum resources, they
create very strict limits in order to prevent overuse or congestion. See, for
instance, power limits and equipment rules on Part 15 and “unlicensed” devices.
68
69
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often suffers from the same problems as command-and-control,
including economic distortions and the endless refereeing of
commercial disputes. This need to intervene, to set ad hoc rules, and
proscribe certain business models in a regulated commons can
create endemic underuse of the resource. 73
For example, in 1968, nearly one-third of peak-time New York
City air traffic—the busiest region in the US—was general aviation
(that is, small, personal) aircraft. 74 To combat severe congestion,
local authorities raised minimum landing fees by a mere $25 (1968
dollars) on sub 25-seat aircraft. 75 General aviation traffic at peak
times immediately fell over 30% 76—suggesting that a massive
amount of pre-July 1968 air traffic in the region was low-value. The
share of aircraft delayed by 30 or more minutes fell by half, from
17% of flights to about 8%. 77
Even if regulators could determine the “best” UTM vendors,
urban airspace will tend towards underutilization. Regulators are the
only party that can prevent the tragedy of the commons; the
asymmetry towards underutilization arises because aviation
regulators have acute incentive to prevent overuse, since overuse
creates safety hazards. However, as the 1960s experience with New
York airports shows, regulators have a relatively weak incentive to
See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 242, 262
(2005); Brito, supra note 60 (noting that “[i]f government is to assure that
technologies are ‘properly certified’ it must first establish what is proper
certification. It will do this using the tools at its disposal—through a political
regulatory process and without the benefit of the dynamic feedback a market
could provide.”); Thomas W. Hazlett & Brent Skorup, Tragedy of the Regulatory
Commons: LightSquared and the Missing Spectrum Rights, 13 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 1, 15 (2014) (“The “unlicensed spectrum” is governed by technical and
behavioral rules (including power limits) established by regulators.”).
73
See Hazlett & Skorup, supra note 72, at 13–15.
74
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., AIRPORT QUOTAS AND PEAK HOUR PRICING:
THEORY AND PRACTICE, REP. NO. FAA-AVP-775 55-56 Table 9, (1976).
75
Similarly, before being overturned, Logan Airport raised fees on small
aircraft in the 1980s in order to lessen congestion. Daniel R. Polsby, Airport
Pricing of Takeoff and Landing Slots: An Economic Critique of Federal
Regulatory Policy, 89 CAL. L. REV. 779, 809 (2001). The scheme worked and
general aviation traffic fell by about one-third. Id. At 809.
76
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 74, at 55 Table 8.
77
Id. at 57 Table 10.
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maximize productive use of urban airspace. As explained next, the
tools regulators are considering to promote efficient use of lowaltitude airspace have significant tradeoffs.
B. Mandated Interoperability Creates Technology Lock-in
A centralized UTM system, even if privately operated, will
require significant regulatory oversight to protect competition,
regulate pricing, and ensure interoperability between UTM
components. 78 A unified UTM system cannot have competing
operators, so UTM will either be managed by a sole operator or will
need to interoperate on regulated terms with other service providers.
As a Wired magazine story put it, “flying cars aren’t like
smartphones; you can’t let competing tech and protocols coexist
while the market figures it out. Flying cars would require a single
operating system—and therefore either a whole lot of cooperation
between competing companies or a firm grip by the iron hand of
regulators.” 79
There are substantial technical obstacles to a unified,
interoperable UTM system. 80 “Interoperability” in technology has
no agreed-upon meaning, carries immense tradeoffs and it can be
quite complex to define and enforce compliance. 81 A major risk of
mandated UTM interoperability is technology lock-in—the
In many ways, the regulated commons approach for VTOL resembles the
“spectrum commons” movement that was in vogue over a decade ago. See LESSIG,
supra note 60.
79
Alex Davies, Kitty Hawk, Flying Cars, and the Challenges of ‘Going 3d’,
WIRED (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/future-of-transportationkitty-hawk-self-flying-cars/ [https://perma.cc/7AHV-C7XH].
80
Behind the Scenes of Drone Integration: Managing Traffic in the Sky, VA.
TECH. NEWS (May 21, 2018), https://vtnews.vt.edu/articles/2018/05/ictasnasautm2018.html [https://perma.cc/UEG6-FKPC] (“Balancing the requirements
of different aircraft, on different missions, using different software, and doing as
much of it as possible automatically, is a complicated equation.”) (quoting a chief
engineer working on a UTM system).
81
As two scholars noted on the subject, “[t]he problems of too much
interconnectivity present enormous challenges both for organizations and for
society at large.” JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND
PERILS OF HIGHLY INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 2 (2012). Therefore, “most of the
specifics of how to bring interop about [must] be determined on a case-by-case
basis.” Id. at 17.
78
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dominance of an established, but inferior, technology because of
reliance interests long after improved replacement technologies
have developed. 82 John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have studied
interoperability and note, “[t]his problem of lock-in is one of the
core puzzles of interoperability . . . .” 83 As a result, the list of failed
or inordinately costly regulator choices—typically made after years
of fact-finding and research—for interoperable technology elements
is long. 84
UTM interoperability also creates large systematic risk should
the UTM operator encounter technical obsolescence or financial
troubles. For Palfrey and Gasser, air traffic control stands out for its
drawbacks, and UTM carries much of the same inherent rigidity as
traditional air traffic management. Researchers note how difficult it
is to integrate “plainly superior, technologies” like GPS into air
W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In
by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 126 (1989) (describing examples “where
an early-established technology becomes dominant, so that later, superior
alternatives cannot gain a footing”).
83
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 81, at 107.
84
See, e.g., SOCIETY OF CABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERS,
ANSI/SCTE 28 2007 (2007), https://law.resource.org/pub/us/cfr/ibr/005/
scte.28.2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ63-U8CV]; see also, Todd Spangler, FCC
Douses FireWire Requirement for Set-Tops With IP, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (June
21,
2010)
http://www.multichannel.com/news/news/fcc-douses-firewirerequirement-set-tops-ip/378067 [https://perma.cc/ZV7R-R2VL] (explaining that
this mandated technology, marketed as “FireWire,” became a costly
“technological bridge to nowhere” as the industry moved to Internet Protocolbased standards); see generally, Nate Anderson, FCC admits CableCARD a
failure, vows to try something else, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2009)
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/12/fcc-admits-cablecard-a-failurevows-to-try-something-else/ [https://perma.cc/YVH8-542L] (discussing that the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) established IEEE 1394
interfaces for media cables. This standard, marketed as CableCARD, failed
commercially despite government mandates); see also National Highway and
Transportation Administration, Brent Skorup Comment on the Proposed Vehicleto-Vehicle Technology Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Dkt. No.
NHTSA-2016-0126 (Apr. 12, 2017) https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/
skorup-v2v-technologies-pic-v1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FA7B-5K65]
(commenting that the IEEE 802.11p communications standard for vehicle-toanything (V2X) communications has also failed to gain traction despite two
decades of government support).
82
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traffic management. 85 This difficulty to improve traditional air
traffic management is because of “the deeply rooted interoperability
of the current system.” 86 Palfrey and Gasser’s conclusion has
sobering implications for UTM plans: “it is very hard to envision
what a successful interoperability strategy for the next generation of
air traffic control systems will or should look like, because there are
so many stakeholders around the world and so many different
technologies involved.” 87
A centralized, shared UTM system that many parties rely on
makes later modifications very difficult since it increases the
number of parties who have veto power over changes to the
system. 88
C. Competitive Entry Problems and an Unwarranted First-Mover
Advantage
A regulated commons model offers a large first-mover
advantage that is difficult to reverse. As mentioned, several
companies anticipate providing UTM or UTM components. 89
Presumably every prospective UTM operator likewise desires to be
the exclusive UTM operator approved by regulators and needs
extensive control of all VTOL aircraft. As one UTM contender has
said, “[w]e must have direct operational control over every active
element in our network,” have authority to schedule in real-time
every aircraft, and be the primary liaison with the FAA. 90 It’s

PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 81, at 43–44. (explaining that technology
exists to reduce separation times, but because of the free-rider problem, airlines
have declined to make the necessary equipment installations); see also, MICHAEL
BALL ET AL., AUCTIONS FOR THE SAFE, EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE ALLOCATION
OF AIRSPACE SYSTEM RESOURCES, 960 (Peter Cramton et al., eds, MIT Press
2006).
86
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 81, at 107.
87
Id. at 261.
88
Id. at 107.
89
See Press Release, NASA, supra note 5 (reporting that some plan to manage
drones, some plan to manage VTOLs, and some plan to manage both types of
services); see also, Geiver, supra note 28; Ball, supra note 28.
90
Uber, supra note 2 (referring to Uber Elevate Cloud Services).
85
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unclear, at present, which company or companies will manage lowaltitude airspace and on what terms. 91
New users to shared, congested airspace and terminals will be
under immense pressure to operate on a no-interference basis, if
permitted to operate at all, even if they offer more efficient
operations or better technology. 92 VTOL aircraft manufacturers like
Bell anticipate that service will be predetermined routes between
vertiports, 93 which means that first-movers will have an incentive to
capture the popular, high-revenue routes as early as is feasible. 94
The history of airport slot allocation and spectrum access is
instructive. 95 The lesson from aviation history is that once the
ELLETT & CLARK, supra note 29.
So, for instance, when new services are deployed in a regulated commons,
“unlicensed spectrum,” existing operators strenuously object to and lobby against
newcomers. FCC rules stating that existing users in unlicensed bands “shall not
be deemed to have any vested or recognizable right to continued use of any given
frequency” are worth little if politically powerful incumbents resist. 47 C.F.R.
§ 18.111. See Brent Skorup, Spectrum NIMBYs and the Return of FCC Beauty
(July
23,
2015),
Contests?,
TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT
https://techliberation.com/2015/07/23/spectrum-nimbys-and-the-return-of-fccbeauty-contests/ [https://perma.cc/429W-WQFE]; Brito, supra note 60
(“Predictably, Cisco, 3Com, Apple, and other Wi-Fi backers waged a contentious
regulatory war against the rule change claiming that the new HomeRF technology
would interfere with Wi-Fi transmissions.”).
93
Urban Air Mobility Conference, CEO Mitch Snyder Keynote, YOUTUBE
(Apr.
9,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZojkpfHF0Fw
[https://perma.cc/TZ43-PFBR] (“As far as the flight control system goes we will
use predetermined paths to move from vertiport to vertiport.”).
94
Analysts at McKinsey have noted the first-mover advantage phenomenon in
this market. Robin Riedel & Shivika Sahdev, Taxiing for takeoff: The flying cab
in your future, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2019), https://web.archive.org/web/
20190109164929/https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-andlogistics/our-insights/taxiing-for-takeoff-the-flying-cab-in-your-future
[https://perma.cc/UX4K-TLZD] (“It is likely that first movers will have an
advantage by securing the most attractive sites along high-traffic routes.”).
95
It’s recognized today in traditional aviation that “arrival and departure slots
at certain critical airports [are] commodities that have substantial intrinsic value.”
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS 2 (Peter Cramton, Yoav Shaham & Richard
Steinberg, eds., 2006). BALL ET AL., supra note 85, at 995. The Bush DOT
proposed to auction a few slots at congested New York-area airports. See Justin
Baer, US presses on with NY airport slot sales, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008.
The proposal faced immense legal and political resistance and was dropped when
91
92
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centralized allocation apparatus is in place it is very difficult to
dislodge in order to permit market allocation of a federal resource. 96
Incumbents and interested parties resist later additions of exclusive
use because of status quo inertia or because they believe (often
sensibly) they can gain cheaper rights to public assets via
manipulation of the administrative assignment of rights. 97
IV.
PROPOSAL: AUCTION AIRSPACE
To avoid the anticompetitive effects and technology lock-in that
would come from common pool airspace management and
government-selected UTM systems, the federal government should
consider airspace auctions. The auction of low-altitude airspace
should be explored promptly because it is very difficult to reverse
policy once VTOL operators squat on high-revenue routes and are
accustomed to regulated commons access. These auctions would
require the FAA to define geographic tracts of low-altitude airspace

the Obama administration took over. Michael E. Levine, Airport Congestion:
When Theory Meets Reality, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 68 (2009). New York Senator
Chuck Schumer called it a “goofy, harebrained scheme.” Matthew L. Wald,
Democrats Vow to Block Airport-Slot Sale, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2008)
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/nyregion/19airports.html
[https://perma.cc/B4UH-W9R6]. For spectrum history, see Thomas W. Hazlett,
Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License
Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998).
96
See DJ Gribbin et al., supra note 10, at 22–23, 47. The slot rules “limit[ed]
competition and new entrants, [had] an inability to ensure efficient utilization of
slots, and [] encouraged hoarding of slots.”; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
Airline Competition: Industry Operating and Marketing Practices Limit Market
Entry, GAO/RCED-90-147 (Aug. 29, 1990) https://www.gao.gov/assets/
150/149541.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7U4-3974].
97
See Valeen Afualo & John McMillan, Auctions of Rights to Public Property,
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter
Newman ed., 1996). See also FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., Airport Quotas and
Peak Hour Pricing: Theory and Practice 83, Rep. No. FAA-AVP-775 (May 1976),
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/67990/FTL_R_1976_01
.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/2Z7S-LBKA].
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and to auction off exclusive usufruct rights 98 to use that airspace. 99
To promote competition in local markets, airspace tracts could be
divided not simply by geography, but by altitude, like a layer cake. 100
Within the designated airspace tracts and corridors purchased
and combined, private operators would have freedom to select flight
paths, terminal locations, flight speed, and business model. The
federal government might regulate factors like separation
minimums and emergency capabilities but could delegate most
technology and operational choices to the licensees.
The number of financially viable vertiports in a metropolitan
area will be limited. Zoning, noise regulations, prevailing wind
direction, population density, and existing transportation
infrastructure will all be considerations for vertiport placement.
Given this scarcity, aerial corridors connecting likely vertiport
locations—central business district to major airport, for instance—
are a sensible airspace tract configuration.
Aerial corridors are not unheard of in traditional aviation, though
they are typically shared between airlines and they are not
auctioned. “Victor” airways in the U.S., for instance, are aerial
corridors crisscrossing the U.S. about three miles tall and nine miles
wide, further subdivided horizontally. 101 The air traffic system
“Usufruct” derives from Roman law and literally means the right to use land
and collect the fruits of the land. The basic rule for usufruct is that the possessor
of the right may use her interest as she pleases so long as she does not damage the
owner’s—here, the public—reversionary interest. The possessor is not allowed to
sell the usufruct right without consent of the owner. See Epstein, supra note 50,
at 396.
99
Some effort might be made to compensate “displaced” air users, like
helicopter tourism businesses and general aircraft airports. Resistance is to be
expected but displacement will likely occur whatever regulatory system for
VTOL is chosen.
100
Airspace below 200 feet—and airspace subjacent to high-rise buildings—is
needed for terminal access. Terminal access would require real property
acquisitions and compliance with local laws and is outside the purposes of this
paper.
101
See FED. AVIATION ADMIN, Instrument Procedures Handbook, Ch. 2 2–2,
FAA-H-8083-16B (2017), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/
handbooks_manuals/aviation/instrument_procedures_handbook/media/faa-h8083-16b.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWP3-Y84W] (“Airways can be thought of as
98
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operator in the U.K. similarly has an aerial highway system
connecting commercial airports within the country. 102 These airways
are typically three and a half miles tall and ten miles wide with
horizontal subdivisions. 103
It is impossible to determine a priori what the precise, “proper”
VTOL airspace tract size or corridor size but a few principles can be
deduced to guide regulators in determining appropriate size. A
single airspace tract license, or only a handful, in a metropolitan area
creates a monopolization problem and should be avoided. On the
other extreme, a tract size following the borders of a Census block—
there are over eleven million in the U.S.—would likely overwhelm
the government with a massive auction and create inefficient
fragmentation for operators to recombine.
Given the local nature of urban eVTOL transportation, areas
somewhat larger than Census tracts—there are about 66,000 Census
tracts across the U.S. and are about neighborhood size in urban
areas—is a good starting point. Highly-trafficked urban airspace
parcels should probably be smaller sizes, similar to how offshore oil
leases 104 and spectrum licenses 105 are sized, where more valuable
areas have smaller sizes. In other contexts, regulators consult with
three-dimensional highways for aircraft. In most land areas of the world, aircraft
are required to fly airways between the departure and destination airports.”).
102
NAT’L AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES, What We Do, https://www.nats.aero/aboutus/what-we-do/atc-explained/ [https://perma.cc/QYG9-FK2W].
103
Id.
104
PETER CRAMTON, HOW BEST TO AUCTION NATURAL RESOURCES 4 (May 21,
2009),
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/cramton-auctioningnatural-resources.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6FL-CAQK]. See BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY MGM’T, COMBINED LEASING REPORT AS OF MAY 1, 2018, 5 (2018)
https://www.boem.gov/2018-annual-lease-stats/ [https://perma.cc/JRM7-BCT7].
The DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management offers nearly 60,000 lease
blocks covering over 300 million acres in the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of
Mexico. Block size varies but are generally 9 square miles. Id.
105
FED. COMMUNICATION COMM’N, CELLULAR MARKET AREAS (CMAS),
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/wireless/auctions/data/maps/CMA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67Z3-S6JF]. See Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, & Vernon
Smith, Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase, 54 J.L. &
ECON. S125, S158–60 Appendix (2011). The FCC has auctioned licenses for
cellular services for twenty years and license size tends to hover between 400 and
1000 license areas nationwide. Id.
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industry and experts about what geographic tract size is practicable
and output-maximizing. 106
New legislation would be useful to signal the change in national
policy but the FAA may not require new legislation to auction
VTOL airspace. The FAA has broad statutory authority to “assign
. . . the use of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions,
and limitations as [it] may deem necessary in order to insure the
safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace.” 107
Further, the FAA has authority to lease any interest in property,
including airspace, for “adequate compensation” 108 and the
Secretary of Transportation is instructed by statute to “plac[e]
maximum reliance on competitive market forces.” 109 While
exclusive rights to air navigation facilities are prohibited when the
facility has received federal funds, 110 privately-funded facilities can
be exclusively assigned.
Revenue generation from public assets should not dominate
airspace auction priorities but it is a relevant factor because public
trustees like the FAA have a duty to recover fair value. 111 Revenues
from auction or leasing of public assets can be substantial. For
instance, offshore oil auctions have raised over $280 billion from
bonus bids and over $220 billion in government royalties (2015
dollars). 112 Government receipts from spectrum auctions have
CRAMTON, supra note 104. I leave it to other commentators to determine
how revenue is optimally collected, whether royalties, profit-share, or other
mechanism, as well as the auction format.
107
49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2006) (originally enacted as Pub, L, No, 85-726, 72 Stat,
731 (1958)).
108
Air Traffic Management System Performance Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 40110(a)(3) (Supp.V 2017) (giving the FAA express authority to lease property
to others. FAA Final Rule, Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O’Hare
International Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. at 51, 360, 51, 362–63.
109
49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) (2012).
110
49 U.S.C. § 40103(e) (2012).
111
See discussion infra Section IV.A.
112
CRAMTON, supra note 104, at 9. Winning bids from all federal lease sales
for oil and gas extraction from 1954 to 2008 was around $75 billion. See also
DAVID PAUL NORDT, A STUDY OF STRATEGIES FOR OIL AND GAS AUCTIONS 2,
(August 2000) (dissertation, Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M
University).
106
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grossed over $100 billion (2015 dollars) since 1994. 113 These values
are likely dwarfed by the consumer surplus derived from the
commercial operations. 114
A. VTOL Airspace Resembles Other Federal Assets that are
Auctioned
Low-altitude airspace is like many valuable, publicly-owned
natural resources where the federal government stands in as a public
trustee. 115 Public trusteeship generally means government
disposition and leasing to private actors to process is permitted so
long as fair value is received in exchange. 116 Accordingly, under
public trustee theory, there is a presumption that the state should not
grant access to a publicly-owned resource like navigable airspace
for free.
For federal resources where widespread public access and use
cannot feasibly occur, long-term leases for geographic-based tracts
works well. 117 The federal government operates as a public trustee
for several types of natural resources and for decades—in order to
113
BRENT SKORUP, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, THE
IMPORTANCE OF SPECTRUM ACCESS TO THE FUTURE OF INNOVATION 1 (Dec.
2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/skorup-spectrum-access-futureinnovation-mop-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ3F-6CJ6].
114
Hazlett, supra note 72, at 251 (“The capitalized social value of [cellular]
bandwidth [in 2004] likely exceeds $1.6 trillion . . . .”).
115
For a discussion of the public trust doctrine, see Epstein, supra note 6. “The
public trust doctrine is the mirror image of the eminent domain clause. Both are
designed to place limitations upon the power of legislature to divert property,
whether held privately or in common . . . .” Id. at 426. Joseph Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68
MICH. L. REV. 471, 556 (1970) (“It is clear that the judicial techniques developed
in public trust cases need not be limited either to these few conventional interests
[e.g. rivers, streams or parklands] or to questions of disposition of public
properties.”).
116
See Walter J. Mead, Natural Resource Disposal Policy—Oral Auction
Versus Sealed Bids, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 194 (1967); see also Epstein, supra
note 32, at 2358.
117
Geographic-based tracts, it might be said, are an effective market boundary
for these federal resources. For a discussion of effective and ineffective market
boundaries, see Gerald Faulhaber, Policy-induced competition: the
telecommunications experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 73 (2003).

106

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 1

de-conflict competing demands for resources—has delimited
geographic parcels and auctioned usufruct rights and licenses to
those assets. 118 This includes the sale and auction of grazing rights
and “stumpage” rights on public lands, 119 the right to construct radio
frequency transmitters like cellular facilities, 120 offshore wind
energy collection locations, 121 coal extraction on federal lands, 122 oil
retrieval rights in petroleum basins, 123 and mineral extraction
rights. 124
VTOL airspace resembles assets like radio spectrum and
offshore energy locations—where tract auctions work well—more
than it does a common pool resource like rivers or public roads—
where tract auctions do not work well. At a glance, VTOL airspace
appears to resemble public roadways and navigable rivers—
transportation networks with ancient open access or regulated
commons rules. Public roads and navigable waters, after all, allow
significant economic activity and are not auctioned by tracts.

118
See Vernon L. Smith, On Divestiture and the Creation of Property Rights in
Public Lands, 2 CATO J. 663 (1982); Mead, supra note 116.
119
About 76% of state timber volume offered for sale is sold via auction. Ross
Brown et al., Assessing State Timber Sale Policies, Programs and Stumpage Price
Drivers, Staff Paper Series No. 209, Department of Forest Resources, U. Minn.
(May 2010), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d71a/622f1af685ec
5792a13db6c23c98b9391599.pdf [https://perma.cc/96TB-J4R4].
120
Shelanski & Huber, supra note 47.
121
Adam Johnston, US Atlantic Offshore Wind Energy Bidding Proposal
Announced by Obama Administration, CLEANTECHNICA (Dec. 3, 2012),
https://cleantechnica.com/2012/12/03/us-atlantic-offshore-wind-farms-openbusiness/ [https://perma.cc/23AQ-CW6E].
122
Obama White House, THE ECONOMICS OF COAL LEASING ON FEDERAL
LANDS:
ENSURING
A
FAIR
RETURN
TO
TAXPAYERS
6,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160622_ce
a_coal_leasing.pdf%22%22 [https://perma.cc/Q9WH-7UZ7] (“In 2015, roughly
40 percent of coal produced in the United States was extracted from Federal lands
. . . .”).
123
A market for petroleum basins, divided into geographic parcels, developed
because of increased demand for oil. See S. Scott Gaille, Allocation of
International Petroleum Licenses to National Oil Companies: Insights from the
Coase Theorem, 31 ENERGY L.J. 111, 116 (2010).
124
Afualo & McMillan, supra note 97.
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However, airspace above 200 feet differs from roadways and
navigable rivers in crucial ways. 125
First, VTOL airspace more closely resembles spectrum rights or
oil drilling rights in that “the resource cannot exist until the
technology is created.” 126 Use of road and river travel “rights,” in
contrast, do not require the technology or large investments that
airspace use or drilling require. This fact relates to the second
difference: roads and rivers have been actually accessed by the
public for centuries—“propertization” of roads and rivers would be
socially disruptive and nearly impossible to enforce. 127 VTOL
airspace, on the other hand, is fairly “clean” and therefore enforcing
exclusivity is much less socially disruptive than, say, introducing
route exclusivity as a default rule for road or river travel.
The airspace discussed here, then, has access properties more
closely resembling spectrum and offshore oil basins, resources
which are typically demarcated via geographic tracts and auctioned,
not allocated on open access principles like sidewalks, rivers, and
roadways. There is not a longstanding custom of the public
accessing any of these “licensed property” resources because it
requires significant technological know-how and investment to
build and operate a VTOL, an offshore drilling site, or a cellular or
broadcast transmission tower.

Airspace below 200 feet is more easily accessed by the public and open
access regimes might be more appropriate for drones below 200 feet.
126
Epstein, supra note 4, at 212.
127
Epstein, supra note 6, at 417 (“[I]t is hardly conceivable to think of effective
ways to prevent persons on the river from using it for these purposes [like fishing
and bathing] . . . . It is very difficult to exclude persons from using navigable
waters when they cannot be excluded from gaining access to it.”). This reasoning
suggests that “drone airspace,” below 200 feet or so, might not be amenable to
exclusive use and auction. This is particularly true once you factor in the difficult
problems surrounding where “navigable airspace” ends and “real estate”—the
height to where landowners can build—begins.
125
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B. For a New Resource, Regulators Need to Introduce Auctions
Early
One lesson from public resources management literature is that
auctions work best for new or relatively unused resources. 128 First,
it’s difficult for regulators to embrace auctions later when asset
values are higher because auctions empower market processes, often
at the cost of regulator and insiders’ preferences, to determine the
assignment of valuable public property. 129 Second, it is far easier to
introduce property institutions at the start, when the resource is
lightly used, than to create a regulated commons and then reverse
policy.
Economist Gary D. Libecap evaluated natural resources that
were once regulated as a common pool resource but, later, regulators
attempted and only somewhat successfully introduced exclusive
use. 130 For many common pool resources, he concluded, lawmakers
attempt to inject property rights institutions only after conditions
have deteriorated from overuse. 131 At that point, it was often too late
for effective use of exclusive-use property institutions. 132 Aviation
provides a good example of the difficulty of reforming pricing rules
once services are being supplied. Airport congestion fees—which
have been proposed for decades and have theoretical support—are
Gary D. Libecap, Assigning Property Rights in the Common Pool:
Implications for the Prevalence of First-Possession Rules for ITQs in Fisheries,
22 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 407, 408–413 (2007) (noting that “[w]hen there are
no incumbents and rights are distributed by the state to a new, valuable resource
and transaction costs of subsequent exchange are high, then auction is optimal. It
directs the resource to those who will maximize its value and the resource rents
can be secured by the state . . . .”). It was also very difficult to introduce markets
in airline terminals. Levine, supra note 95.
129
Afualo & McMillan, supra note 97. It is routine today to auction spectrum
but there was tremendous FCC resistance for decades, in part because regulators
had long tied spectrum assignment to the regulators’ social goals, like local
broadcast news and children’s programming. See Hazlett, supra note 95.
130
Libecap, supra note 128.
131
Id. at 411 (noting that “formal property rights often are not implemented [by
the state] until either resource values are very high (the rental losses of open access
or central regulation are very large) or until late in the use of a resource when the
open-access losses have largely been borne and the stock is close to depletion. At
that time, the benefits of property rights become clearer.”).
132
Id.
128
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strongly resisted by air transport operators and thus have gained
little traction. 133
V.

THE BENEFITS OF AIRSPACE AUCTIONS OVER
REGULATED COMMONS AIRSPACE
Exclusive-use auction assignment and flexible-use rules fill
several important needs. 134 For the following reasons, exclusive
use—intra-firm optimization within auctioned tracts—may generate
more VTOL and delivery services more quickly than inter-firm
sharing of airspace and terminals. In particular, an exclusive-use
regime for airspace allocation may, relative to regulated commons
access to airspace and terminals, reduce costly conflicts over
resource use and allow for more dynamic efficiencies.
First, auctions and flexible-use rules allow operator autonomy
within a distributed system. A federated system offers significant
dynamic efficiency upside. The current regulatory proposals for an
interoperable network like UTM would likely provide system
uniformity at a large cost to innovation and the introduction of better
aircraft and component systems. 135 As Palfrey and Gasser noted in
their research on the subject, the “deeply rooted interoperability” of
the traditional airspace system accounts for the difficulty in updating
the system, “even when there are good reasons for doing so.” 136
Airspace tract licenses, similar to spectrum licenses and unlike the
regulated commons management, preserves option value, allows
modularity, and allows combination of routes. In short, operators
See, e.g., Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Another Look at Airport
Congestion Pricing, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1970 (2007).
134
David C. Parkes & Lyle H. Ungar, An Auction-Based Method for
Decentralized Train Scheduling, PROC. OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS, 43, 43–50 (2001).
135
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 81, at 149 (indicating that providers have
an incentive to privately negotiate interoperability: “[m]ore and more firms,
especially in the information business, are shedding their proprietary approaches
in favor of interoperability at multiple levels. The goal is not to be charitable to
competitors or customers, of course, but to maximize returns over time by
building an ecosystem with others that holds greater promise than the go-it-alone
approach.”).
136
Id. at 107.
133
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would have more freedom to expand routes and recombine routes in
response to business opportunities.
Exclusive-use rights also free companies from possible
equipment mandates to operate on a regulated commons system.
Exclusive use limits the need, for instance, for mandated highprecision, interoperable, and expensive (regulated) sensor systems.
Firms can optimize their own systems without concerning
themselves with the capabilities and technologies of competing
systems since airspace assignment would physically separate VTOL
flight corridors. Sensor systems require a significant amount of
computational and battery overhead and add weight to aircraft.
Exclusive use means the assurance of clear airspace and should
allow VTOL operators more freedom to reduce the number and
complexity of sensors.
Spectrum illustrates how important these dynamic efficiencies
are, because there are “huge variations in the intensity of use of
different portions of the spectrum” based on the underlying rules. 137
Spectrum auctions have been a tremendous policy success largely
because spectrum uses are delegated to several companies on a
geographically exclusive basis. 138 Exclusive-use airspace tracts give
companies more freedom to iterate on their private UTM systems—
similar to how cellular companies iterate upon and upgrade their
radio access network technologies—and find operational

Epstein, supra note 4, at 213.
Aside from the substantial government revenues, the private investment in
directly ancillary products and services (mobile devices, apps, nationwide fiber
and mobile networks) and consumer welfare gains have been massive. Thomas
Hazlett noted in 2005 when exclusively assigned by the FCC:
[Spectrum] is intensively shared. Common access among millions of subscribers
is organized by network operators which, with broad rights to control the use of
specific frequencies, invest heavily to provide opportunities for consumers to
communicate via wireless networks. This investment can be summarized in both
physical capital-for instance, the creation of 174,368 cellular base stations-and
financial capital-the expenditure of $156 billion in aggregate capital investment
(book value through June 2004).
Hazlett, supra note 72, at 249.
137
138
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efficiencies that would not be possible with a shared, interoperable
UTM system. 139
Second, the transferability and subleasing of airspace tracts
means first-movers and existing technologies are not unduly favored
in initial allocation. It is self-evident that the UTM systems and
VTOL aircraft of today will improve, if permitted, since they
involve emerging technologies. A unified UTM and regulatorassigned routes and vertiports injects rigidity into the system since
the community-based traffic management system that regulators
envision would require new operators who wish to enter the market
or introduce new routes, more frequent flights, or new vertiports to
receive buy-in from competitors and regulators. 140 The ability to
transfer and lease airspace tracts means that incumbent users have a
financial incentive to transfer the resource to its highest-valued use
and to new entrants. At present, there is no mechanism in the UTM
plans for incentivizing incumbent VTOL operators to transfer routes
to new, innovative entrants.
Third, competitive bidding and a secondary market in airspace
tracts compels operators to reveal truthful information about their
value for the resource. Once a UTM system is designed and selected,
regulators and their approved UTM operators cannot expect VTOL
operators “with private information about its time constraints, value,
and costs” to report accurate access valuations to a centralized

139
Preliminary evidence from drone flights suggest the benefit of a single
operator. Medical drones in Rwanda “fly[] in the exact same path. This is how we
ensure that the system operates in a predictable, reliable, ultimately boring way.
Logistics should be boring. There shouldn’t be any surprises.” Owning “the full
stack” is important because “when one small team of hardworking engineers can
own the entire system from scratch you can move fast.” Alice Lloyd George,
Using drones to build the ambulance fleet of the future, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 25,
2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/25/using-drones-to-build-the-ambulancefleet-of-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/R545-VNDY]. Similarly, drone deliveries in
Iceland are operating with exclusive, fixed routes. Phillip E. Ross, Are Delivery
Drones Commercially Viable? Iceland Is About to Find Out, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/drones/are-delivery-dronescommercially-viable-iceland-is-about-to-find-out
[https://perma.cc/NP2C2XK8].
140
NASA, supra note 3, at 4–5.
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allocator. 141 Operators will misrepresent or omit information when
“it will improve its own schedule in the system-wide solution.” 142
This is the experience of traditional airlines, for instance, which
hoard allocated slots and fly unprofitable flights in order to maintain
the valuable routes. 143 Further, shared routes and terminals
encourage overscheduling since the gains from a reduction in use
cannot be internalized by the innovative or efficient company. 144
Overscheduling, therefore, can be a tactic to raise rivals’ costs, 145
and should be anticipated with a shared UTM system.
Fourth, exclusive, geographic rights to airspace tracts give
licensees stability of possession that induces the significant
investment necessary for mass air taxi operations. Long-term
licenses give companies the assurance they need to make high-fixed
costs for permitting, vertiports, electrical grid upgrades,
concessions, and related infrastructure construction. With a
regulated commons and sharing of routes and terminals, investments
are more precarious because continued operations depend on
regulators’ ad hoc decisions at who receives airspace and terminal
access during times of congestion. 146 In contrast, when a single party
exclusively controls routes and terminals, delays, congestion, and
cancellations are internalized. 147 This internalization of costs should
Parkes & Ungar, supra note 134, at 43.
Id.
143
DJ Gribbin et al., supra note 10; Levine, supra note 95, at 58–59.
144
Traditional airlines overschedule operations and “generat[e] excessive flight
delays, cancellations, and loss-of-separation violations” because if an airline acts
responsibly and doesn’t overschedule at a busy airport, it has simply given a
competitor opportunities to schedule more flights. BALL ET AL., supra note 85, at
954.
145
BALL ET AL., supra note 85, at 954–55.
146
NASA, supra note 3, at 4–5.
147
There’s some evidence for this in the aviation literature. See Jan K.
Brueckner, Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 1357, 1357–58 (2002) (finding that a monopoly airline “internalizes
the congestion each flight imposes on the other flights it operates”) (emphasis in
original). Further, using empirical evidence of the 25 most delayed US airports,
“delays fall as airline market power rises.” Id. at 1371; see also C. Mayer & T.
Sinai, Network Effects, Congestion Externalities, and Air Traffic Delays: Or Why
Not All Delays Are Evil, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1194, 1206 (2003) (“We also find
evidence that airports with low concentration have higher delays, possibly
141
142
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operate as a powerful incentive to maintain infrastructure and
systems.
Finally, a system for auctioning geographic aerial tracts for
VTOL service reduces the number of dimensions with which
aviation regulators need to concern themselves. Geographic
partition and auction of airspace would allow for the competitive
development of UTM and reduce contests over airspace and
vertiport access. With no need to prescribe technology standards,
referee conflicts over congested urban airspace, and select amongst
many UTM operators, the FAA could focus on its core mission of
safety. This includes developing separation standards, testing new
VTOLs for airworthiness, identifying emergency landing areas in
urban areas, and developing standards for vertiport construction.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Technology improvements have made the prospect for mass air
transit plausible, and regulators and manufacturers globally are
racing towards autonomous flight. However, technology shocks can
create resource conflicts and the need for a dramatic shift in legal
institutions. U.S. regulators are public trustees of federal airspace
and should study long-standing practices towards the disposition of
assets. In particular, the identification and auction of geographic
tracts of airspace could give VTOL and aviation startups the
possession stability they need to maximize investment in
autonomous technology and ground-based facilities. The lessons
from the auction of other federal assets like spectrum, oil fields, and
wind energy leases are not dispositive, but they provide evidence
that auctioning airspace tracts could allow for the rapid and safe
deployment of an air taxi industry in the U.S.

because carriers do not fully internalize the costs their flights impose on other
carriers.”).
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